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Abstract— In this paper, an aggregate game is adopted for
the modeling and analysis of energy consumption control in
smart grid. Since the electricity users’ cost functions depend
on the aggregate energy consumption, which is unknown to
the end users, an average consensus protocol is employed to
estimate it. By neighboring communication among the users
about their estimations on the aggregate energy consumption,
Nash seeking strategies are developed. Convergence properties
are explored for the proposed Nash seeking strategies. For
energy consumption game that may have multiple isolated Nash
equilibria, a local convergence result is derived. The conver-
gence is established by utilizing singular perturbation analysis
and Lyapunov stability analysis. Energy consumption control
for a network of heating, ventilation, and air conditioning
(HVAC) systems is investigated. Based on the uniqueness of
the Nash equilibrium, it is shown that the players’ actions
converge to a neighborhood of the unique Nash equilibrium
non-locally. More specially, if the unique Nash equilibrium is
an inner Nash equilibrium, an exponential convergence result
is obtained. Energy consumption game with stubborn players
is studied. In this case, the actions of the rational players can
be driven to a neighborhood of their best response strategies by
using the proposed method. Numerical examples are presented
to verify the effectiveness of the proposed methods.
Index Terms— Energy consumption control; aggregate game;
Nash equilibrium seeking
I. INTRODUCTION
Demand response schemes are designed to motivate the
electricity users to adjust their energy consumptions to the
desired profile based on supply conditions [1]. Due to the
benefits, such as improving system reliability, efficiency,
security and customer bill savings, great efforts have been
dedicated to control and optimization problems related to
demand response in smart grid (e.g., see [2]-[5] and the refer-
ences therein). The electricity users are categorized as price-
takers and price-anticipating users in the existing literatures
[7]. The price-takers schedule their energy consumptions
regardless of their effect on the electricity price. In contrast,
the price-anticipating users consider the impact of their
energy consumptions on the electricity price. Industrial users
and commercial users with large energy consumption are
typical examples of price-anticipating users. Taking the price
as a function of the aggregate energy consumption brings
up coupled energy consumption control problems among the
electricity users.
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Game theory is an effective modeling and analysis tool to
deal with the interactions among the electricity consumers
[2]. Game theoretical approaches such as stackelberg game,
evolutionary game, differential game, just to name a few,
have been extensively utilized to design and analyze demand
response schemes in smart grid (e.g., [8]-[21]). For exam-
ple, in [8], Stackelberg game was leveraged to model the
interaction between the demand response aggregators and
generators. The Nash equilibrium of the game among the
generators was computed via solving a centralized quadratic
optimization problem. In [9], the authors considered peak-
to-average ratio (PAR) minimization and energy cost mini-
mization by designing a non-cooperative energy consumption
game. By communicating among the players on their sched-
uled daily energy consumptions, a Nash seeking strategy
was proposed. A coupled-constraint game was used in [10]
for scheduling residential energy consumption. Noticing that
the best response algorithm suffers from privacy concern, a
gradient projection method based on estimations of the price
changing trend was proposed at the cost of computation time
and memory. Multiple utility companies were considered in
[11] where the authors used a two-level game approach to
manage the interactions. The competition among the utility
companies was described by a non-cooperative game. The
users were modeled as evolutionary game players. Consid-
ering the system dynamics, a differential game approach
was proposed in [12]. In this paper, the energy consumption
control is considered as an aggregate game [22]-[24] on
graph.
Related Work: The main objective of this paper is to
achieve Nash equilibrium seeking (e.g., see [26]-[30] and
the references therein for an incomplete reference list) in
energy consumption game. Different from many Nash seek-
ing strategies where full communication among the players
is used, in [25] and [30], the Nash equilibrium is attained
by utilizing neighboring communication. An aggregate game
(e.g., see [22]-[25]) in which the players interact through
the sum of the players’ actions was investigated in [25].
By utilizing a gossip algorithm, the players can search for
the Nash equilibrium through neighboring communication.
This idea was further generalized in [30]. The players were
considered to be generally interacting with each other. The
game on graph was then solved via using a gossip algorithm.
Similar to [25] and [30], this paper leverages the idea of game
on graph to solve energy consumption game in smart grid.
This paper aims to solve energy consumption control for
a network of price-anticipating electricity users. Compared
with the existing works, the main contributions of the paper
are summarized as follows.
• An aggregate game is adopted for the modeling and
analysis of energy consumption control in smart grid.
By using game on graph, the users update their ac-
tions based on the communication with their neighbors.
This scheme reduces the communication between the
electricity users with the centralized agent (e.g., energy
provider). Hence, the single-node congestion problem
is relieved.
• An aggregate game that may admit multiple isolated
Nash equilibria is firstly considered. Based on an av-
erage consensus protocol, a Nash seeking strategy is
proposed for the players. An energy consumption game
for a network of heating, ventilation and air condition-
ing (HVAC) systems, in which the Nash equilibrium
is unique, is investigated. The Nash seeking strategy
is designed based on a primal-dual dynamics. More
specifically, if the unique Nash equilibrium is an inner
Nash equilibrium, an exponential convergence result
is derived. Energy consumption game with stubborn
players is studied. It is shown that with the presence of
stubborn players, the rational players’ actions converge
to a neighborhood of their best response strategies. The
proposed Nash seeking strategies serve as alternative
approaches for the gossip-algorithm in [25] to solve
aggregative game on graph.
• The end-users only need to communicate with their
neighbors on their estimations of the aggregate energy
consumption. They don’t need to share their own energy
consumptions with their opponents. Hence, the privacy
of the electricity users is protected.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section
II, some related preliminaries are provided. System model
and the problem formulation are given in Section III. A
general energy consumption game that may have multiple
Nash equilibria is studied in Section IV without considering
the constraints. Energy consumption game among a network
of HVAC systems is investigated in Section V. In Section VI,
numerical examples are provided to verify the effectiveness
of the proposed methods. Conclusions and future directions
are stated in Section VII.
II. PRELIMINARIES AND NOTATIONS
In this paper, R represents for the set of real numbers, R+
stands for the set of non-negative real numbers and R++ is
the set of positive real numbers. Furthermore, diag{ki} for
i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N} is defined as
diag{ki} =

k1 0 · · · 0
0 k2
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
0 · · · kN
 ,
and [hi]vec for i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N} is defined as [hi]vec =
[h1, h2, · · · , hN ]T .
A. Game Theory
Below are some definitions on game theory [24]-[34].
Definition 1: A game in normal form is defined as a triple
Γ , {N, X,C} where N = {1, 2, · · · , N} is the set of N
players, X = X1 × · · · ×XN , Xi ⊂ R is the set of actions
for player i, and C = (C1, · · · , CN ) where Ci is the cost
function of player i.
Definition 2: (Potential game) A game Γ is a potential
game if there exists a function P such that
∂Ci(li, l−i)
∂li
=
∂P (li, l−i)
∂li
, (1)
∀i ∈ N. Furthermore, the function P is the potential
function. In (1), li denotes the action of player i and, l−i
denotes all the players’ actions other than the action of player
i, i.e., l−i = [l1, · · · , li−1, li+1, · · · , lN ]T .
Definition 3: (Aggregate game) An aggregate game is a
normal form game with the players’ cost functions depending
only on its own action and a linear aggregate of the full action
profile.
Definition 4: (Nash equilibrium) Nash equilibrium is an
action profile on which no player can reduce its cost by
unilaterally changing its own action, i.e., an action profile
l∗ = (l∗i , l
∗
−i) ∈ X is the Nash equilibrium if for all the
players
Ci(l
∗
i , l
∗
−i) ≤ Ci(li, l
∗
−i), ∀i ∈ N (2)
for all li ∈ Xi.
For an aggregate game Γ with the aggregate function being
l¯ =
∑N
i=1 li, an equilibrium of the aggregate game Γ is an
action profile l∗ ∈ X on which ∀i ∈ N
Ci(l
∗
i , l
∗
i +
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
l∗j ) ≤ Ci(li, li +
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
l∗j ), ∀li ∈ Xi
and the associated equilibrium aggregate is denoted as l¯∗ =∑N
i=1 l
∗
i .
B. Graph Theory
For a graph defined as G = (V,E) where E is the
edge set satisfying E ⊂ V × V with V = {1, 2, · · · , N}
being the set of nodes in the network, it is undirected if
for every (i, j) ∈ E, (j, i) ∈ E. An undirected graph
is connected if there exists a path between any pair of
distinct vertices. The element in the adjacency matrix A
is defined as aij = 1 if node j is connected with node i,
else, aij = 0. The neighboring set of agent i is defined as
Ni = {j ∈ V |(j, i) ∈ E}. The Laplacian matrix for the
graph L is defined as L = D¯ − A where D¯ is defined as a
diagonal matrix whose ith diagonal element is equal to the
out degree of node i, represented by
∑N
j=1 aij .
C. Dynamic Average Consensus
Theorem 1: [39], [40] Let G be a connected, undirected
graph, L be the Laplacian of G. Then, for any constant ω ∈
RN , the state of the following system[
x˙
y˙
]
=
[
−I − L −L
L 0
] [
x
y
]
+
[
ω
0
]
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Fig. 1: A simplified illustration of the electricity buying and
selling model.
with arbitrary initial conditions x(0),y(0) ∈ RN remains
bounded and x(t) converges exponentially to 1
N
1Tω1 as
t → ∞ where 1 denotes an N dimensional column vector
composed of 1.
D. Saddle Point
The pair (x∗,y∗) is the saddle point of F (x,y) if
F (x∗,y) ≤ F (x∗,y∗) ≤ F (x,y∗), (3)
is satisfied [5], [6].
III. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
Consider an electricity market with a network of N
price-anticipating users. The simplified illustration of the
electricity buying and selling model is shown in Fig. 1.
The users are equipped with an energy-management
controller (EMC) and an advanced metering infrastructure
(AMI) [38]. The EMC is used to schedule the electricity
usage for the corresponding user. The AMI enables bidirec-
tional communication among the electricity users and the
centralized agent (e.g., the energy provider). The communi-
cation between the electricity users and their neighbors can
be modeled by an undirected and connected graph. In this
paper, we suppose that the electricity users schedule their
energy consumption by minimizing their own costs.
Let li be the energy consumption of user i. Then, the cost
of user i can be quantified as [38],
Ci(li, l¯) = Vi(li) + P (l¯)li, (4)
where l¯ is the aggregate energy consumption of all the
electricity users, i.e., l¯ =
∑N
j=1lj . Furthermore, Vi(li) is the
load curtailment cost [38]. The term P (l¯)li represents the
billing payment for the consumption of energy li where the
price P (l¯) is a function of the aggregate energy consumption
l¯.
For each user, the energy consumption should be within
its acceptable range, i.e., li ∈ [lmini , lmaxi ] where lmini < lmaxi
and lmini , lmaxi are the minimal and maximal acceptable
energy consumption for user i, respectively. The problem
is defined as follows.
Problem 1: (Strategy Design for the Electricity Con-
sumers in the Energy Consumption Game) In the energy
consumption game, the electricity users are the players. The
energy consumption li and Ci(li, l¯) are the action and cost
of player i, respectively. Player i’s objective is defined as
min
li
Ci(li, l¯)
subject to lmini ≤ li ≤ lmaxi , i ∈ N,
where N = {1, 2, · · · , N} denotes the set of electricity
users. The aggregate energy consumption l¯ is unknown to
the players. Suppose that the pure-strategy Nash equilibrium
exists and is isolated. Furthermore, Ci, i ∈ N are smooth
functions over RN . Design a control strategy for the players
such that they can search for the Nash equilibrium.
Remark 1: In practice, providing the aggregate energy
consumption l¯ to all the users is challenging for the cen-
tralized agent when the users are dynamically updating their
actions. Hence, we consider the Nash equilibrium seeking
under the condition that the users have no access to the
aggregate energy consumption l¯. But the users are allowed
to communicate with their neighbors on the estimations of
the aggregate energy consumption. Furthermore, we suppose
that the centralized agent can broadcast the total number of
electricity users N to all the electricity users in the network.
In summary, the energy consumption control considered
in this paper is based on the following assumption.
Assumption 1: The electricity users can communicate
with their neighbors via an undirected and connected graph.
Furthermore, the total number of the electricity users, N , is
known to all the electricity users.
IV. ENERGY CONSUMPTION GAME DESIGN AND
ANALYSIS
In this section, the energy consumption game is considered
in the general form (the pricing function is not specified). For
simplicity, the constraints lmini ≤ li ≤ lmaxi , i ∈ N, are not
considered in this section.
A. Game Analysis
Before we proceed to facilitate the subsequent analysis,
the following assumptions are made.
Assumption 2: [29] There exists isolated, stable Nash
equilibrium on which
∂Ci
∂li
(l∗) = 0,
∂2Ci
∂l2i
(l∗) > 0, ∀i ∈ N
(5)
where l∗ denotes the Nash equilibrium.
Assumption 3: [29] The matrix
B =

∂2C1
∂l2
1
(l∗) ∂
2C1
∂l1∂l2
(l∗) · · · ∂
2C1
∂l1∂lN
(l∗)
∂2C2
∂l1∂l2
(l∗) ∂
2C2
∂l2
2
(l∗)
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
∂2CN
∂l1∂lN
(l∗) · · · ∂
2CN
∂l2
N
(l∗)
 (6)
is strictly diagonally dominant.
Inspired by [25], let Di denote player i’s estimation on the
aggregate energy consumption. By using the estimations, the
players’ objectives can be rewritten as:
Problem 2: Player i’s objective is
min
li
Ci(li, Di), (7)
where Di =
∑N
j=1 lj , ∀i ∈ N.
In the following, a consensus based method will be
proposed to search for the Nash equilibrium of the energy
consumption game (without considering the constraints).
B. Nash Equilibrium Seeking for the Aggregate Energy Con-
sumption Game
Based on the consensus protocol in [39]-[40], the Nash
seeking strategy for player i, i ∈ N is designed as
D˙i = −Di −
∑
j∈Ni
(Di −Dj)−
∑
j∈Ni
(κi − κj) +Nli (8a)
κ˙i =
∑
j∈Ni
(Di −Dj) (8b)
l˙i = −k¯i(
∂Vi
∂li
+ P (Di) + li
∂P (Di)
∂Di
), (8c)
where Ni denotes the neighboring set of player i, k¯i =
δki, i ∈ N, δ is a small positive parameter and ki is a fixed
positive parameter. Furthermore, κi, i ∈ N are intermediate
variables.
Writing (8) in the concatenated form gives[
D˙
κ˙
]
=
[
−I − L −L
L 0
] [
D
κ
]
+
[
N l
0
]
(9a)
l˙ =− δk([
∂Vi
∂li
+ P (Di) + li
∂P (Di)
∂Di
]vec), (9b)
where k is defined as k = diag{ki}, i ∈ N, D, κ, l
are the concatenated vectors of Di, κi, li, respectively. Let
U = [U˜ , µ] be an N × N dimensional orthonormal matrix
such that µTL = 0 where µ is an N dimensional column
vector. Furthermore, let κ = U
[
κ˜
κµ
]
where κ˜ is an N −1
dimensional column vector [5]. Then, the closed-loop system
can be rewritten as[
D˙
˙˜κ
]
=
[
−I − L −LU˜
U˜TL 0
][
D
κ˜
]
+
[
N l
0
]
(10a)
l˙ = −δk([
∂Vi
∂li
+ P (Di) + li
∂P (Di)
∂Di
]vec), (10b)
and
κ˙µ = 0, (11)
which indicates that κµ(t) = κ(0).
Suppose that De(l), κ˜e(l) are the quasi-steady states of
D and κ˜, respectively, i.e.,[
−I − L −LU˜
U˜TL 0
][
De(l)
κ˜
e(l)
]
+
[
N l
0
]
= 0, (12)
for fixed l. Note that De(l), κ˜e(l) is unique for fixed l as
the matrix
[
−I − L −LU˜
U˜TL 0
]
is Hurwitz [40]. Then, by
direct calculation, it can be derived that
[
−I − L −L
L 0
] [
De(l)
U [(κ˜e(l))T , κµ]
T
]
+
[
N l
0
]
= 0,
(13)
which indicates that De(l) is the equilibrium of the original
system. Hence, by using Theorem 1, it can be concluded that
De(l) = 1
∑N
i=1 li for fixed l.
Theorem 2: Suppose that Assumptions 1-3 hold. Then,
there exists a positive constant δ∗ such that for every
0 < δ < δ∗, (l(t),D(t), κ˜(t)) converges exponentially to
(l∗,1
∑N
i=1 l
∗
i , κ˜
e(l∗)) under (10) given that ||l(0) − l∗||,
||D(0)−1
∑N
i=1 l
∗
i ||, ||κ˜(0)− κ˜
e(l∗)|| are sufficiently small.
Proof: Let τ = δt. Then, in the τ -time scale, the reduced-
system is[
δ dD
dτ
δ dκ˜
dτ
]
=
[
−I − L −LU˜
U˜TL 0
][
D
κ˜
]
+
[
N l
0
]
(14a)
dl
dτ
= −k([
∂Vi
∂li
+ P (Di) + li
∂P (Di)
∂Di
]vec). (14b)
Quasi-steady state analysis: letting δ = 0 freezes D and
κ˜ at the quasi-steady state on which Di =
∑N
j=1 lj , ∀i ∈ N.
Hence, the reduced-system is
dl
dτ
=− k([
∂Vi
∂li
+ P (Di) + li
∂P (Di)
∂Di
]vec)
=− k([
∂Ci(li, l−i)
∂li
]vec).
(15)
Linearizing (15) at the Nash equilibrium point l∗ gives,
dl
dτ
= −kB(l− l∗), (16)
where −kB is Hurwitz by Assumption 3 and the Gershgorin
Circle Theorem [48]. Hence, the equilibrium point l∗ is lo-
cally exponentially stable under (15), i.e., there exist positive
constants ̺1 and ̺2 such that (denote the trajectory of (15)
as lr(τ ))
||lr(τ )− l
∗|| ≤ ̺1e
−̺
2
τ ||lr(0)− l
∗||, (17)
given that ||lr(0)− l∗|| is sufficiently small.
Boundary-layer analysis: Since (De(l), κ˜e(l)) satisfies,[
−I − L −LU˜
U˜TL 0
][
De(l)
κ˜
e(l)
]
+
[
N l
0
]
= 0, (18)
it can be derived that De(l), κ˜e(l) are linear functions of l
as the matrix
[
−I − L −LU˜
U˜TL 0
]
is non-singular.
Let
D
′
= D−De
κ˜
′
= κ− κe.
(19)
Then,
δ
[
dD
′
dτ
dκ˜
′
dτ
]
=
[
−I − L −LU˜
U˜TL 0
][
D′ +De
κ˜
′ + κ˜e
]
+
[
N l
0
]
− δ
[
∂DeT
∂l
T
∂κ˜eT
∂l
T
]
× (−k([
∂Vi
∂li
+ P (D′i +
N∑
j=1
lj)
+ li
∂P (D′i +
∑N
j=1 lj)
∂(D′i +
∑N
j=1 lj)
]vec))
=
[
−I − L −LU˜
U˜TL 0
][
D′
κ˜
′
]
− δ
[
∂DeT
∂l
T
∂κ˜eT
∂l
T
]
(−k([
∂Vi
∂li
+ P (D′i +
N∑
j=1
lj)
+ li
∂P (D′i +
∑N
j=1 lj)
∂(D′i +
∑N
j=1 lj)
]vec)).
(20)
Hence, in t-time scale[
dD
′
dt
dκ˜
′
dt
]
=
[
−I − L −LU˜
U˜TL 0
][
D′
κ˜
′
]
− δ
[
∂DeT
∂l
T
∂κ˜eT
∂l
T
]
(−k([
∂Vi
∂li
+ P (D′i +
N∑
j=1
lj)
+ li
∂P (D′i +
∑N
j=1 lj)
∂(D′i +
∑N
j=1 lj)
]vec)).
(21)
Letting δ = 0 gives the boundary-layer model of (14) as
[
dD
′
dt
dκ˜
′
dt
]
=
[
−I − L −LU˜
U˜TL 0
][
D
′
κ˜
′
]
. (22)
Since the matrix
[
−I − L −LU˜
U˜TL 0
]
is Hurwitz, the equi-
librium point of the boundary-layer model D′ = 0, κ˜
′
= 0
is exponentially stable, uniformly in (t, l).
Therefore, by Theorem 11.4 in [42], it can be concluded
that there exists a positive constant δ∗ such that for all 0 <
δ < δ∗, (l∗,1
∑N
i=1 l
∗
i , κ˜
e(l∗)) is exponentially stable under
(10).

From the analysis, it can be seen that all the states in (8)
stay bounded and l(t) produced by (8) converges to the Nash
equilibrium under the given conditions.
In this section, a Nash seeking strategy is proposed without
requiring the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium. In the fol-
lowing section, energy consumption game for HVAC systems
where the Nash equilibrium is unique will be considered.
V. ENERGY CONSUMPTION GAME AMONG A NETWORK
OF HVAC SYSTEMS
For HVAC systems, the load curtailment cost may be
modeled as [38]
Vi(li) = νiξ
2
i (li − lˆi)
2, i ∈ N, (23)
where νi and ξi are thermal coefficients, νiξ2i > 0 and lˆi is
the energy needed to maintain the indoor temperature of the
HVAC system. When the pricing function is
P (l¯) = a
N∑
i=1
li + p0, (24)
where a is a non-negative constant and a < mini∈N 2νiξ
2
i
N−3 for
N > 3, the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium is ensured
[38].
Based on this given model, a Nash seeking strategy
will be proposed in this section for the players to search
for the unique Nash equilibrium (by assuming that a <
mini∈N
2νiξ
2
i
N−3 for N > 3 in the rest of the paper).
A. Nash Equilibrium Seeking for Energy Consumption Game
of HVAC Systems
Lemma 1: The energy consumption game is a potential
game with a potential function being
Q(l) =
N∑
i=1
νiξ
2
i (li−lˆi)
2+
N∑
i=1
a(
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
lj)li+
N∑
i=1
(al2i+p0li).
(25)
Proof: Noticing that
∂Q(l)
∂li
=
∂Ci(l)
∂li
, ∀i ∈ N, (26)
the conclusion can be derived by using the definition of
potential game. 
Based on the primal-dual dynamics in [43], the Nash
seeking strategy for player i is designed as
D˙i = −Di −
∑
j∈Ni
(Di −Dj)−
∑
j∈Ni
(κi − κj) +Nli
(27a)
κ˙i =
∑
j∈Ni
(Di −Dj) (27b)
l˙i = −k¯i(
∂Vi
∂li
+ P (Di) + ali − ηi1 + ηi2) (27c)
η˙i1 = m¯i1ηi1(l
min
i − li) (27d)
η˙i2 = m¯i2ηi2(li − l
max
i ), i ∈ N (27e)
where m¯ij = δmij for all i ∈ N, j ∈ {1, 2}, mij are fixed
positive parameters and ηij(0) > 0, i ∈ N, j ∈ {1, 2}.
By introducing the orthonormal matrix U as in Section
IV-B, the system in (27) can be rewritten as[
D˙
˙˜κ
]
=
[
−I − L −LU˜
U˜TL 0
][
D
κ˜
]
+
[
N l
0
]
(28a)
l˙i = −k¯i(
∂Vi
∂li
+ P (Di) + ali − ηi1 + ηi2) (28b)
η˙i1 = m¯i1ηi1(l
min
i − li) (28c)
η˙i2 = m¯i2ηi2(li − l
max
i ), i ∈ N (28d)
and
κ˙µ = 0. (29)
Theorem 3: Suppose that Assumption 1 is satisfied. Then,
there exists β ∈ KL such that for each pair of strictly positive
real number (∆, v), there exists δ(∆, v) > 0, such that
||χ(t)|| ≤ β(||χ(0)||, δt) + v, (30)
for all t ≥ 0, ||χ(0)|| ≤ ∆ under (28) given that ηij(0) >
0, i ∈ N, j ∈ {1, 2}. In (30), χ(t) = [(l(t) − l∗)T , (D(t) −
1
∑N
i=1 l
∗
i )
T , (κ˜(t) − κ˜e(l∗))T , (η(t) − η∗)T ]T , and η, η∗
are defined in the subsequent proof.
Proof: Following the proof of Theorem 2 by using singular
perturbation analysis, the reduced-system in τ -time scale is
given by
dli
dτ
= −ki(2νiξ
2
i (li − lˆi) + a
N∑
j=1
lj + p0 + ali − ηi1 + ηi2)
dηi1
dτ
= mi1ηi1(l
min
i − li)
dηi2
dτ
= mi2ηi2(li − l
max
i ), i ∈ N.
(31)
According to Lemma 1, the energy consumption game is
a potential game. Hence, the Nash seeking can be achieved
by solving
min
l
Q(l)
subject to lmini ≤ li ≤ lmaxi , i ∈ N.
(32)
In the following, we show that (31) can be used to solve
the problem in (32).
Define the Lagrangian function as L(l,η) = Q(l) +∑N
i=1(ηi1(l
min
i − li) + ηi2(li − l
max
i )) where η =
[η11, η12, η21, η22, · · · , ηi1, ηi2, · · · , ηN1, ηN2]
T ∈ R2N+ .
The dual problem for the minimization problem in (32) can
be formulated as
max
η≥0
min
l
L(l,η). (33)
The Hessian matrix of Q(l) is
H =

2ν1ξ
2
1 + 2a a · · · a
a 2ν2ξ
2
2 + 2a · · · a
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
a a · · · 2νNξ
2
N + 2a
 .
Since a < mini∈N 2νiξ
2
i
N−3 for N > 3, H is positive definite by
the Gershgorin Circle Theorem [48]. Hence, Q(l) is strictly
convex in l as its Hessian matrix is positive definite. Noting
that the inequality constraints are linear, the problem in (32)
has strong duality [47]. Hence, l∗ is the optimal solution to
the problem in (32) if and only if there exists η∗ ∈ R2N+ such
that (l∗,η∗) is the saddle point of L(l,η) by the saddle point
theorem [47].
By defining the Lyapunov candidate function as [43]
VL =
1
2
(l− l∗)Tk−1(l− l∗)+
N∑
i=1
2∑
j=1
1
mij
(ηij − η
∗
ij − η
∗
ij log(ηij) + η
∗
ij log(η
∗
ij)),
(34)
where (l∗,η∗) is the saddle point of L(l,η), it can be shown
that the saddle point of L(l,η) is globally asymptotically
stable under (31) by Corollary 2 of [43] given that ηij(0) >
0, i ∈ N, j ∈ {1, 2}.
Hence, the strategy in (31) enables l to converge to the
Nash equilibrium of the potential game asymptotically.
Combining this result with the exponential stability of the
boundary-layer system (see Theorem 2 for boundary-layer
analysis), the result can be derived by using Lemma 1 in
[44] (see also [45] for more details). 
B. Nash Equilibrium Seeking for Energy Consumption Game
of HVAC Systems with A Unique Inner Nash Equilibrium
In the following, energy consumption game with a unique
inner Nash equilibrium is considered 1. If the constraints
do not affect the value of the Nash equilibrium, the Nash
seeking strategy can be designed as
D˙i = −Di −
∑
j∈Ni
(Di −Dj)−
∑
j∈Ni
(κi − κj) +Nli
(35a)
κ˙i =
∑
j∈Ni
(Di −Dj) (35b)
l˙i = −k¯i(
∂Vi
∂li
+ P (Di) + ali). (35c)
By introducing the orthonormal matrix U as in Section
IV-B, the system in (35) can be rewritten as
[
D˙
˙˜κ
]
=
[
−I − L −LU˜
U˜TL 0
][
D
κ˜
]
+
[
N l
0
]
(36a)
l˙i = −k¯i(
∂Vi
∂li
+ P (Di) + ali), i ∈ N (36b)
and
κ˙µ = 0. (37)
Theorem 4: Suppose that Assumption 1 is satisfied. Then,
there exists a positive constant δ∗ such that for every
1To make it clear, in this paper, we say that the Nash equilibrium is
an inner Nash equilibrium if the Nash equilibrium satisfies lmin
i
< l∗
i
<
lmax
i
,∀i ∈ N, i.e., the Nash equilibrium is achieved at ∂Ci
∂li
= 0,∀i ∈ N.
0 < δ < δ∗, (l(t),D(t), κ˜(t)) converges exponentially to
(l∗,1
∑N
i=1 l
∗
i , κ˜
e(l∗)) under (36).
Proof: Following the proof of Theorem 2 by using singular
perturbation analysis, the reduced-system at τ -time scale is
given by
dli
dτ
= −ki(2νiξ
2
i (li − lˆi) + a
N∑
j=1
lj + p0 + ali), i ∈ N.
(38)
From (38), it can be derived that
˙˜
l = −kH l˜, (39)
where l˜(t) = l− l∗.
Hence, it can be shown that in τ -time scale
||˜l(τ )|| ≤
√
maxi∈N{ki}
mini∈N{ki}
e−mini∈N{ki}λmin{H}τ ||˜l(0)||,
(40)
by defining the Lyapunov candidate function as VL =
1
2 l˜
Tk−1˜l [29].
Combining this result with the exponential stability of the
boundary-layer system (see Theorem 2 for boundary-layer
analysis), the conclusion can be derived by Theorem 11.4 in
[42] (see the proof of Theorem 2 for more details) . 
Remark 2: When the constraints do not affect the value
of the Nash equilibrium, the updating strategy in (35) is a
special case of the one in (8). It can be seen that the result
in Theorem 4 is stronger than the result in Theorem 2 under
the given HVAC model.
C. Energy Consumption Game of HVAC Systems with Stub-
born Players
In this section, a special case where some players commit
to the coordination process while keeping a constant energy
consumption is considered. Without loss of generality, we
suppose that player i is a stubborn player and updates its
action according to
D˙i = −Di −
∑
j∈Ni
(Di −Dj)−
∑
j∈Ni
(κi − κj) +Nl
s
i ,
(41a)
κ˙i =
∑
j∈Ni
(Di −Dj), (41b)
where lsi is the constant energy consumption of player
i. Furthermore, all the rational players adopt (35) if the
constraints do not affect the value of all the players’ best
response strategies, else, all the rational players adopt (27).
By introducing the orthonormal matrix U as in Section
IV-B, then
[
D˙
˙˜κ
]
=
[
−I − L −LU˜
U˜TL 0
][
D
κ˜
]
+
[
N l
0
]
, (42)
in which the ith component of l is fixed to be lsi , and
κ˙µ = 0. (43)
Furthermore,
l˙j = −k¯j(
∂Vj
∂lj
+ P (Dj) + alj − ηj1 + ηj2)
η˙j1 = m¯j1ηj1(l
min
j − lj)
η˙j2 = m¯j2ηj2(lj − l
max
j ), j ∈ N, j 6= i
(44)
if all the rational players adopt (27), and
l˙j = −k¯j(
∂Vj
∂lj
+ P (Dj) + alj), j ∈ N, j 6= i (45)
if all the rational players adopt (35).
Corollary 1: Suppose that Assumption 1 is satisfied.
Then, there exists β ∈ KL such that for each pair of strictly
positive real number (∆, v), there exists δ(∆, v) > 0, such
that
||χbr(t)|| ≤ β(||χbr(0)||, δt) + v, (46)
for all t ≥ 0, ||χbr(0)|| ≤ ∆ under (42) and (44)
given that ηkj(0) > 0, k ∈ N, k 6= i, j ∈ {1, 2}.
In (46), χbr(t) = [ˇl−i(t)T , (D(t) − 1(
∑N
j=1,j 6=i l
br
j +
lsi ))
T , (κ˜(t) − κ˜e(lbr−i, l
s
i ))
T , (η−i(t) − η
br
−i)
T ]T , lˇ−i(t) =
[lˇ1(t), · · · , lˇi−1(t), lˇi+1(t), · · · , lˇN (t)]T , lˇj(t) = lj(t) −
lbrj , j ∈ N, j 6= i and lbrj denotes the best response strategy of
player j, lbr−i is the concatenated vector of lbrj , i ∈ N, j 6= i,
η−i, η
br
−i are defined in the subsequent proof.
Furthermore, if the constraints lminj ≤ lj ≤ lmaxj , j ∈
N, j 6= i do not affect the values of the best response
strategies, then, there exists a positive constant δ∗ such that
for every 0 < δ < δ∗, (ˇl−i(t),D(t) − 1(
∑N
j=1,j 6=i l
br
j +
lsi ), κ˜(t)−κ˜
e(lbr−i, l
s
i )) converges exponentially to zero under
(42) and (45).
Proof: Following the proof of Theorem 2 by using singular
perturbation analysis to get the reduced-system for both
cases. The first part of the Corollary can be derived by
noticing that the following is satisfied,
∂Q
′
(l−i)
∂lj
=
∂Cj
∂lj
, (47)
for all j 6= i, where
Q
′
(l−i) =
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
νjξ
2
j (lj − lˆj)
2 +
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
a(
N∑
k=1,k 6=i,k 6=j
lk)lj
+
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
(al2j + (p0 + al
s
i )lj).
(48)
Define
L
′
(l−i,η−i) = Q
′
(l−i) +
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
ηj1(l
min
j − lj)
+
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
ηj2(lj − l
max
j ),
(49)
where η−i ∈ R
2(N−1)
+ denotes the concatenated vector of
ηjk, j ∈ N and j 6= i, k ∈ {1, 2}.
Then, the dual problem is
max
η
−i
≥0
min
l−i
L
′
(l−i,η−i).
Noticing that lbr−i is the best response strategies of the rational
players if and only if there exists ηbr−i ∈ R
2(N−1)
+ such that
(lbr−i,η
br
−i) is the saddle point of L
′
(l−i,η−i), the rest of the
proof follows that of Theorem 3.
If the constraints lminj ≤ lj ≤ lmaxj , j ∈ N, j 6= i do not
affect the value of the best response strategies and all the
rational players adopt (35), then, the reduced-system at the
quasi-steady state is
dlj
dτ
= −kj
∂Cj(l−i)
∂lj
= −kj[2νjξ
2
j (lj − lˆj) + a
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
lj + p0 + al
s
i + alj ]
= −kj[2νjξ
2
j lˇj + a
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
lˇj + alˇj], i ∈ N.
(50)
Writing (50) in the concatenated form gives
dˇl−i
dτ
= −kH1lˇ−i, (51)
where H1 ∈ RN−1 ×RN−1 is defined as
H1 =

h1 a · · · a
.
.
.
hi−1
hi+1
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
a · · · hN

,
with hj = 2νjξ2j + 2a. Since a < mini∈N
2νiξ
2
i
N−3 for N > 3,
it can be derived that the matrix H1 is symmetric and strictly
diagonally dominant with all the diagonal elements positive.
Hence, the matrix −kH1 is Hurwitz by the Gershgorin Circle
Theorem [48].
By similar analysis in Theorem 4, the conclusion can be
derived. 
Remark 3: In this Corollary, only one player (i.e., player
i) is supposed to be stubborn. However, this is not restrictive
as similar results can be derived if multiple stubborn players
exist.
Remark 4: In the proposed Nash seeking strategy, the
players only communicate with its neighbors on Di and κi.
They do not communicate on their own energy consumption
li. Hence, the proposed Nash seeking strategy does not
lead to privacy concern for the users. The work in [29]
provided an extremum seeking method to seek for the Nash
equilibrium in non-cooperative games. However, the method
in [29] can’t be directly implemented for Nash seeking
in the energy consumption game if the aggregate energy
consumption is not directly available to the players.
32 4
51
Fig. 2: Communication graph for the electricity users
TABLE I: Parameters in the simulation.
user 1 user 2 user 3 user 4 user 5
lˆi(kWh) 50 55 60 65 70
lmax
i
(kWh) 60 66 72 78 84
lmin
i
(kWh) 40 44 46 52 56
a 0.04
p0 (MU/kWh) 5
VI. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
A. Simulation Setup
In this section, we consider a network of 5 commer-
cial/industrial users that are equipped with HVAC systems.
The electricity users communicate with each other via an
undirected and connected graph as shown in Fig. 2. The cost
function for electricity user i is
Ci(li, l¯) = νiξ
2
i (li − lˆi)
2 + P (l¯)li, (52)
where the pricing function P (l¯) = a
∑N
i=1 li + p0 [38].
Without loss of generality, suppose that νiξ2i for all i ∈ N
are normalized to 1 in the simulation. For i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5},
lmini = 0.8lˆi and lmaxi = 1.2lˆi except that in Section VI-B,
lmin1 and lmax1 are set separately. The parameters are listed
in Table I2.
B. Energy Consumption Control of HVAC Systems
In this section, we suppose that lmin1 = 45 and lmax1 =
55. By direct computation, it can be derived that the Nash
equilibrium is l∗ = (45, 46.4, 51.3, 56.2, 61.1)(kWh). The
equilibrium aggregate is l¯∗ = 259.9(kWh). Hence, the Nash
equilibrium is not an inner Nash equilibrium.
The simulation results by using the seeking strategy in
(27) are shown in Figs. 3-4.
Fig. 3 shows the users’ electricity energy consumptions
produced by the proposed seeking strategy in (27) and Fig.
4 indicates that the users’ estimations on the aggregate
energy consumptions converge to the actual aggregate energy
consumption.
From the simulation results, it can be seen that the energy
consumptions produced by the proposed method converge to
the Nash equilibrium of the energy consumption game.
2MU stands for Monetary Unit.
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Fig. 3: The users’ energy consumptions produced by the
proposed seeking strategy in (27).
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Fig. 4: The actual aggregate energy consumption and the
users’ estimations on the aggregate energy consumption
produced by the proposed seeking strategy in (27).
C. Energy Consumption Control of HVAC Systems with A
Unique inner Nash equilibrium
In this section, we consider the energy consumption
game under the setting in Section VI-A. By direct cal-
culation, it can be derived that the Nash equilibrium is
l∗ = (41.5, 46.4, 51.3, 56.2, 61.1)(kWh). The equilibrium
aggregate is l¯∗ = 256.7(kWh). The Nash equilibrium is an
inner Nash equilibrium and the seeking strategy in (35) is
used in the simulation. The simulation results produced by
the seeking strategy in (35) are shown in Figs. 5-6.
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Fig. 5: The users’ energy consumptions produced by the
proposed seeking strategy in (35).
From the simulation results, it can be seen that the
users’ energy consumptions converge to the unique Nash
equilibrium.
D. Energy Consumption Control with Stubborn Players
In this section, we suppose that player 5 is a stubborn
player that commits to a constant energy consumption ls5 =
100(kWh). Then, player 1-4’s best response strategies are
40.8(kWh), 45.7(kWh), 50.6(kWh), and 55.5(kWh), respec-
tively. The aggregate energy consumption is 292.7(kWh). In
the simulation, the rational players adopt (35) to update their
actions. The stubborn player uses the seeking strategy in (41).
The simulation results produced by the proposed method are
shown in Figs. 7-8.
It can be seen that with the presence of the stubborn player,
all the other players’ actions converge to the best response
strategies with respect to the stubborn action.
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
This paper considers energy consumption control among
a network of electricity users. The problem is solved by
using an aggregative game on an undirected and connected
graph. To estimate the aggregate energy consumption, which
is supposed to be unknown to the players during the Nash
seeking process, an average consensus protocol is employed.
The convergence property is analytically studied via using
singular perturbation and Lyapunov stability analysis. A
general energy consumption game where multiple Nash equi-
libria may exist is firstly considered. A Nash seeking strategy
based on consensus is proposed to enable the users to search
for the Nash equilibrium. Energy consumption control of
HVAC systems with linear pricing functions is then studied.
Convergence results are provided. Furthermore, stubborn
players are investigated and it is shown that the rational
players’ actions converge to the best response strategies.
For future directions, the following aspects would be
considered:
1) The design of incentive provoking mechanisms. As
Nash solution is usually not efficient from the system-
level perspective, socially optimal solution might be
preferred if coordination is allowed. Incentive provok-
ing mechanisms can be designed to motivate the elec-
tricity users to coordinate such that system efficiency
can be improved [5].
2) Analysis of the energy consumption game with the
existence of cheaters. This includes the detection of
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Fig. 7: The users’ energy consumptions produced by the
proposed method (i.e., the rational players adopt (35) and
the stubborn player adopts (41)).
cheaters, the design of penalty (e.g., [49]) or reward
algorithms to prevent cheating behaviors, etc.
3) Nash seeking for energy consumption game under
various communication conditions.
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